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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY - ~- f .h {;1 
Paul C. Giannelli · V (hf>l 
Professor of law d h A 1T,.._, b)). Case Western Reserve University I r r 
Both courts and commentators have noted the prob-
lems of eyewitness identifications. In United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967), the Supreme Court 
commented: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification 
are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with 
instances of mistaken identification." LaFave and Israel 
provide the following account: 
A dramatic example of the dangers inherent in 
accepting the identification testimony even of several 
eyewitnesses in the absence of corroborative 
evidence is the case of Adolph Beck. Mistakenly iden-
tified by twenty-two witnesses, Beck served seven 
years in prison tor crimes he did not commit. Subse-
quently, a committee formed to investigate the case 
concluded that "evidence as to identity based on 
personal impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps 
of all classes of evidence the least to be relied upon, 
and therefore, unless supported by other facts, an 
unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury." More recently, 
seven eyewitnesses swore that Bernard T. Pagano 
was the man who politely pointed a small, chrome-
plated pistol at them and demanded their money. 
Fortunately, midway through the trial of the Roman 
Catholic priest, Ronald Clouser admitted that he, not 
Father Pagano, had committed the six armed robber-
ies. 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 549 
(1984). 
A substantial amount of psychological research also 
supports the proposition that eyewitness identifications 
are often problematic. See Evaluating Witness Evidence: 
Recent Psychological Research and New Perspectives 
(S. Lloyd-Bostock & B. Clifford eds. 1983); B. Clifford & R. 
Bull, Psychology of Person Identification (1978); E. 
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); A. Yarmey, Psychol-
ogy of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Eyewitness Testimo-
ny: Psychological Perspectives (G. Wells & E. Loftus eds. 
1984); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Crimina/Identifi-
cation: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1079 (1973). 
Psychological research on eyewitness identification 
dates back to the turn of the century. See H. Munster-
berg, On the Witness Stand: Essays on Psychology and 
Crime (1908). It is estimated, however, that "over 85% of 
the entire published literature has surfaced since 1978." 
Wells & Loftus, Eyewitness Research: Then and Now, in 
Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives 1, 3 
(G. Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1984). This research empha-
sizes the complex nature of human perception and 
memory. Human perception and memory do not function 
like a videotape recorder, accurately recording all images 
which can subsequently be retrieved fully. Rather, it is a 
constructive process, in which many factors play a part. 
Perception 
The perception and memory process can be divided 
into three stages. The first is the acquisition stage, during 
which the event is perceived and entered in the memory. 
The second is the retention stage -the time between 
the event and its recollection. The third stage is there-
trieval stage during which the information relating to the 
event is recalled. E. Loftus, supra, at 21.1naccuracies 
can be introduced at all three stages. A number of factors 
influence accuracy during the acquisition stage. The lit-
erature indicates that witnesses are more accurate when: 
(1) exposure time is longer rather than shorter, (2) events 
are less rather than more violent, (3) witnesses are not 
subject to extreme stress, (4) witnesses are tree from 
biased expectations, (5) witnesses are young adults rath-
er than children, and (6) witnesses are asked to report on 
salient aspects of an event rather than peripheral aspects. 
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Research 
and Legal Thought, in 3 Crime and Justice: An Annual 
Review of Research 105, 115-16 (M. Tonry & N. Morris 
eds. 1981). 
Memory 
Studies of the retention of information indicate that two 
factors influence the accuracy of the memory during the 
retention stage. First, the longer the interval between the 
event and the recollection of the event, the greater the 
lapse in memory. However, the lapse in memory does not 
decrease at a uniform rate; it decreases sharply immedi-
ately after the event and then more slowly over a period 
of time. E. Loftus, supra at 53. Second, new information 
enters the memory between the event and its recollec-
tion: "External information provided from the outside can 
~--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
Cuyahoga County Public Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender. 
Copyright © 1987 Paul Giannelli 
[: 
I!. 
! 
I"!' .1' 
j: 
I 
intrude into the witness's memory, as can his own. 
thoughts, and both can cause dramatic changes in his 
recollection." /d. at 87. Finally, the way in which informa-
tion is retrieved can influence memory. For example, the 
method of questioning, the type of identification proce-
dure employed, the status of the questioner, and nonver-
bal communication clues all may distort memory. Loftus, 
supra at 110. Facial recognition presents special prob-
lems, especially cross-racial identifications. Johnson, 
Cross-Racial identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 
Cornell L. Rev. 934, 938 (1984)("The impairment in ability 
to recognize black faces is substantial."). Dr. Elizabeth 
Loftus, a prominent researcher in this field, notes that 
people "have greater difficulty in recognizing faces of 
another race than faces of their own race. This cross-
racial identification problem is not due to the fact that 
people have greater prejudices or less experience with 
members of the other race." E. Loftus, supra at 139. 
Jury Impact 
The research reveals also that the impact of eyewit-
ness identifications on juries is substantial. See Brigham 
& Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate 
the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 Law & Hum. 
Behav. 19 (1983). In commenting on the research, Dr. 
Loftus has written that eyewitness testimony "is likely to 
be believed by jurors, especially when it is offered with a 
high level of confidence, even though the accuracy of an 
eyewitness and the confidence of that witness may not 
be related to one another at all." E. Loftus, supra at 19. 
Indeed, two researchers have concluded that "the 
eyewitness accuracy-confidence relationship is weak 
under good laboratory conditions and functionally 
useless in forensically representative settings." Wells & 
Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, inEyewitness Testimo-
ny: Psychological Perspectives 155, 165 (G. Wells & E. 
Loftus eds. 1984). · 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
The courts have taken several approaches to eyewit-
ness identification testimony. One approach is based on 
a constitutional analysis- the right to counsel and due 
process. 
Right to Counsel 
Prior to 1967 the reliability of eyewitness identifications 
was primarily a jury issue. In that year, however, the 
Supreme Court decided three cases that "constitutional-
ized" this area of criminal law. Two of the cases- United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 
388 U.S. 263 (1967)- involved the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. Because of the innumerable ways in 
which identification procedures can affect the accuracy 
of eyewitness identifications, the Court in Wade held that 
a lineup is a "critical stage" of the criminal process, 
thereby entitling the defendant to the assistance of coun-
sel. The presence of counsel, according to the Court, 
would assure that a defendant could effectively chal-
lenge a subsequent in-court identification based upon a 
suggestive pretrial identification. 
Since it appears that there is grave potential for preju-
dice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which 
may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since 
2 
presence of counsel itself can. often avert prejudice 
and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there 
can be little doubt that ... [a post-indictment lineup 
is] a critical stage of the prosecution ... 388 U.S. at 
236-37. 
The right to counsel offered perhaps the greatest 
protection against erroneous eyewitness identifications 
because the presence of counsel would discourage the 
use of suggestive procedures by the police. In Kirby v. 
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), however, the Court restricted 
the right to counsel. Under Kirby, the right to counsel 
attaches only after the "initiation of adversary judicial 
crfmiiialprocelfditfgs .. . "/d. at 68R The "grave potential 
for prejudice" cited in Wade is not diminished simply be-
cause judicial criminal proceedings have yet to com-
mence. Thus, Kirby ignored the underlying rationale of 
Wade, which is the need to protect the ability of the ac-
cused to confront effectively the eyewitnesses' identifica-
tion at trial. Since most lineups are held before the com-
mencement of judicial proceedings, the right to counsel 
is now applicable only in a smallnumber of cases. See 
generally 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure§ 
7.3 (1984); N. Sobel, Eye-Witness Identification: Legal 
and Practical Problems § 2 (2d ed. 1983). 
Due Process 
At the same time it decided Wade and Gilbert, the 
Court also held that identification procedures implicate 
the due process clause. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 
(1967). This development is important because a criminal 
defendant's right to due process is more extensive than 
his right to counsel; all identifications are subject to scru-
tiny under a due process analysis. Thus, identifications 
made prior to the attachment ofthe right to counsel, 
Kirby v.lllinois,.406.l).S. 682, 691 (1972); identifications 
involving photographic displays, Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); and presumably, even identi-
fications at which counsel is present, may be suppressed 
as violative of due process. 
The standard used by the Court in determining wheth-
er an identification comports with due process has un-
dergone a substantial evolution since Stovall was decid-
ed. In Stovall, the due process test was whether the iden-
tification was"unnecessarily suggestive and conducive 
to irreparable mistaken identification." 388 U.S. at 302. 
The focus of this test is the reliability of the identification 
procedure used by the police; if the procedure is both 
suggestive and unnecessary, it offends due process. 
Although the Court considered the issue in a number of 
cases after Stovall, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 
377 (1968); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Cole-
man v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), it was not until Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), that it became apparent that 
the Stovall standard had been substantially diluted. The 
new standard- whether a substantial likelihood of misi-
dentification has occurred- focuses on the reliability of 
the actual identification rather than on the reliability of 
the identification procedure. In determining whether 
there has been a substantial likelihood of misidentifica-
tion the trial court must evaluate the "totality of the cir-
cumstances," including "the opportunity of the witness to 
view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' 
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior 
description of the criminal, the level of certainty demon-
strated by the witness at the confrontation, and the 
length of time between the crime and the confrontation." 
!d. at 199-200. 
The Court's most recent treatment of the subject, Man-
son v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), may have altered 
again the due process test. After reaffirming Biggers and 
referring to the factors cited in Biggers as relevant to the 
totality of the circumstances test, the Court stated: 
"Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting 
effect of the suggestive identification itself." !d. at 114. 
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, read this state-
ment as a recognition of the continued validity of Stovall: 
In assessing the reliability of the identification, the 
Court mandates weighing "the corrupting effect of the 
suggestive identification itself" against the indicators 
of [a witness'] ability to make an accurate identifica-
tion ... The Court holds, as Neil v. Biggers, failed to, 
that a due process identification inquiry must take 
account of the suggestiveness of a confrontation and 
the likelihood that it led to misidentification, as recog-
nized in Stovall and Wade. Thus, even if a witness did 
have an otherwise adequate opportunity to view a 
criminal, the later use of a highly suggestive identifica-
tion procedure can render this testimony inadmissible. 
!d. at 129. 
See generally 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Proce-
dure§ 7.4 (1984); N. Sobel, Eye-Witness Identification: 
Legal and Practical Problems§ 3 (2d ed. 1983). 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
The dilution of the due process test and the restriction 
of the right to cbunsel has undercut the constitutional 
approach to the eyewitness identification problem. Ac-
cordingly, several other approaches have been proposed. 
Some courts, in an attempt to minimize the dangers of 
eyewitness identifications, have required cautionary in-
structions. In United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972), the court proposed the following model in-
struction: 
One of the most important issues in this case is the 
·identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime. The Government has the burden of proving 
identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is essential that 
the witness himself be free from doubt as to the 
correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury, 
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
accuracy of the identification of the defendant before 
you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person 
who committed the crime, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. Its value depends on the 
opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at 
the time of the offense and to make a reliable identifi-
cation later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a 
witness, you should consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the 
capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the 
offender? 
3 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity 
to observe the offender at the time of the offense will 
be affected by such matters as how long or short a 
time was available, how far or close the witness was 
how good were lighting conditions, whether the ' 
witness had had occasion to see or know the person 
in the past. 
[In general, a witness bases any identification he 
makes on his perception through the use of his 
senses. 
Usually the witness identifies an offender by the 
sense of sight- but this is not necessarily so, and he 
may use other senses.] 
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by 
the witness subsequent to the offense was the product 
of his own recollection? You may take into account 
both the strength of the identification, and the circum-
stances under which the identification was made. 
If the identification by the witness may have been 
influenced by the circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to him for identification, you 
should scrutinize the identification with great care. You 
may also consider the length of time that lapsed 
between the occurrence of the crime and the next 
opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a 
factor bearing on the reliability of the identification. 
[You may also take into account that an identifica-
tion made by picking the defendant out of a group of 
similar individuals is generally more reliable than one 
which results from the presentation of the defendant 
alone to the witness.] 
[(3) You may take into account any occasions in 
which the witness failed to make an identification of 
defendant, or made an identification that was incon-
sistent with his identification at trial.] 
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each 
identification witness in the same way as any other 
witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider 
whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make 
a reliable observation on the matter covered in his 
testimony. 
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the 
prosecutor extends to every element of the crime 
charged, and this specifically includes the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime with which 
he stands charged. If after examining the testimony, 
you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the 
identification, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
(Paragraphs in brackets are to be used only if appro-
priate.) !d. at 558-59. 
The Te!faire court emphasized that a failure to use the 
model instruction with appropriate adaptations "would 
constitute a risk [of r!3versal] in future cases." /d. at 557. 
Several federal courts have explicitly mandated the use 
of this instruction or a substantial equivalent. See United 
States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1975); Unit-
ed States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1974). 
Other federal courts have expressed their approval of the 
instruction but leave the final decision on whether to give 
the instruction to the discretion of the trial court. See 
United States v. Scott; 578 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir.), cert. 
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denied1A-39US, £370{1978); United States v. Kavanagh, 
572 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Dodge, 538 
F.2~ .??,9.}84 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 
(1979); Unife(:fSlates v. Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19 (8th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976). 
Several state courts also favor jury instructions. See 
State v. Benjamin, 33 Conn. Supp. 586, 589, 363 A.2d 
762, 764 (1976); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 397, 635 
P.2d 1236, 1244 (1981); State v. Calia, 15 Or. App. 110, 
114-15, 514 P.2d 1354, 1356 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 
917 (1974); but see People v. Hefner, 70 Ill. App. 3d 693, 
697, 388 N.E.2d-1059, 1062 (1979) (rejecting the use of 
jury instrUctiohs): 
In Ohio the use of the instruction is left to the discretion 
of the trial judge. See State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 266, 
272, 421N:E2d 157; 161 (1981); State v. Caldwell, 19 
Ohio App: 3d 104, 107, 483 N.E.2d 187, 191 (1984); State 
v. Dale, 3 Ohio App. 3d 431,434-35,445 N.E.2d 1137, 
ii40•41 (1982) (finding an abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's refusal to give an instruction). See generally Note, 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Need for 
Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 Wash. 
U.L.Q. 1387 (1983); Annot., 23 A.L.R.4th 1089 (1983). 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
In c;tddition to the constitutional and jury instructions 
issues, some commentators have advocated the use of 
expert testimony concerning the problems of eyewitness 
identifications. One of the first writers to propose this 
solution wrote: 
[The] presentation to the trier of fact of expert psycho-
logical testimony about the unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony"provides·the proper safeguard for the prob-
lems identification evidence poses. 
The expert witness can relate-the findings of numer-
ous studies and experiments that psychologists have 
conducted to test the general reliability of eyewitness 
identification and can analyze the various cognitive 
and social factors that may have affected the accuracy 
of the particular identification in the case at hand ... 
[S]uch expert psychological testimony can respond to 
the particular facts of a case and, more importantly, 
can furnish the jurors with the scientific information 
needed for a full and proper evaluation of the identifi-
cation evidence. Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? 
Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of 
Eyew_itnessldentification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969, 
1006-07(1977). 
Until recently, however, the overwhelming majority of 
courts were not receptive to expert testimony concerning 
the identification process. Most federal courts have 
upheld a trial court's decision to exclude such testimony. 
See United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315 (11th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2679 (1985); United 
Stat.es v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984); Unit-
ed States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Fosher, 590 
F.2d 381,383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 540 
F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1100 (1977); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 
(9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom, United 
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); United States v. 
Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973); United States 
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v. Dodson, 16 M.J. 921, 930(N.C.M.R.1983), modified, 21 
M.J. 237 (C. M.A. 1986); United States v. Hicks, 7 M.J. 
561, 566 (A.C.M.R. 1979). See also Rodriguez v. Wain-
wright, 740 F.2d 884, 885 (11th Cir. 1984)(no constitution-
al vio!ation i_ndexclfusion of experdt testimony onS .~ 
eyew1tness 1 enti ication), cert. enied, 469 U .. 1113 
(1985). 
Similarly, a substantial majority of state courts have 
upheld the exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness 
identifications. See Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 370-71, 
642 S.W.2d 865, 872 (1982); Dyas v. United States, 376 
A.2d 827, 831-32 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); 
Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1983), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1051(1984); State v. Hoisington, 104 
Idaho 153, 165, 657 P.2d 17, 29 (1983); People v. Dixon, 87 
Ill. App. 3d 814, 818, 410 N.E.2d 252, 256 (1980); State v. 
Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736, 741-42 (Iowa 1979); State v. 
Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1981); 
State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 944-45 (La. 1982); State 
v. Fernald, 397 A.2d 194, 197 (Me. 1979); Commonw~alth 
v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 101,453 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 
(1983); State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545,547 (Minn. 
1980); Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 147-48, 576 P.2d 275, 
278-79 (1978); State v. Sims, 3 Ohio App. 3d 321, 324-26, 
445 N.E.2d 235, 240-41 (1981); State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 
882, 892-93, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (1979); State v. Wooden, 
658 S.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1983); State v. 
Onorato, 142 Vt. 99, 104-05, 453 A.2d 393, 395-96 (1982); 
State v. Barry, 25 Wash. App. 751, 760-61, 611 P.2d 1262, 
1267 (1980); Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 461, 285 
N.W.2d 868, 873 (1979). 
Various rationales have been offered to support this , 
result. First, some courts have held that expert testimony \ 
on this subject is unnecessary, or at least not helpful, 
because the jury is capable of evaluating defiCiencies in 
eyewitness testimony. According to these courts, "effec-
tive cross-examination is adequate to reveal any incon-
sistencies or deficiencies in the eye-witness testimony." 
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 
1973). Second, there has been some concern about the 
scientific basis for such testimony. One court found that 
the work in the field "still remains inadequate to justify its 
admission into evidence." United States v. Watson, 587 
F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 
(1979). Third, there is a concern that expert testimony on 
this issue will"invade the province of the jury." United 
States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on 
other grounds sub. nom, United States v. Nobles, 422 
U.S. 225 (1975). Fourth, some courts have excluded 
expert testimony because it would entail a time-consum-
ing "battle of experts" that may confuse the jury. United 
States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383-84 (1st Cir. 1979). 
Several recent cases, however, have adopted a more 
receptive attitude to expert testimony conceming the 
problems of eyewitness identifications. In particular, 
these courts have questioned the principal obstacle to 
admissibility- the view that eyewitness identification 
problems are readily understood by juries and therefore 
expert testimony is neither necessary nor helpful. 
State v. Chapple 
In State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 
(1983), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the exclu-
sion of expert testimony under the facts of that case was 
an abuse of discretion: 
Even assuming that jurors of ordinary education need 
no expert testimony to enlighten them to the danger of 
eyewitness identification, the offer of proof indicated 
that Dr. Loftus' testimony would have informed the jury 
that there are many specific variables which affect the 
accuracy of identification and which apply to the facts 
of this case. /d. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1220. 
First, the expert would have testified that the "curve of 
forgetting" is not uniform; forgetting occurs very quickly 
and then tends to level off. Thus, an immediate identifica-
tion is far more reliable thana long~delayed identifica-
tion. Second, whereas most laymen believe that stress 
causes people to remember better, the experimental 
research indicates that stress causes the opposite effect. 
Third, there is the problem of "unconscious transfer." 
This involves a situation where the witness fails to make 
a photographic identification and then later sees the 
same face in a subsequent photo display. The eyewit-
ness may associate the face with the crime instead of the 
prior photo display. Fourth, the assimilation of post-event 
information, such as the feedback of another eyewitness, 
may taint the identification. Finally, the research data 
indicates that there is no relationship between the confi-
dence of a witness in making an identification and the 
accuracy of that identification. /d. at 292-94, 660 P.2d 
1220-21. 
People v. McDonald 
The California Supreme Court also has held that 
expert testimony may be proper: "We conclude that 
although jurors may not be totally unaware of the ... 
psychological factors bearing on eyewitness identifica-
tion, the body of information now available on these 
matters is 'sufficiently beyond common experience' that 
in appropriate cases expert opinion thereon could at 
least 'assist the trier of fact."' People v. McDonald, 37 
Cal. 3d 351, 369, 690 P.2d 709, 721, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 
248 (1984). In particular, the dangers of cross-racial iden-
tifications played an important role in the court's analy-
sis. The expert could have testified that laboratory 
experiments indicated that own-race/other-race recogni-
tion rates differed by as much as 30 percent. 
The studies also reveal two aspects of the matter that 
will probably be contrary to most jurors' intuitions: 
first, that white witnesses who are not racially preju-
diced are just as likely to be mistaken in making a 
cross-racial identification as those who are prejudiced; 
and second, that white witnesses who have had 
considerable social contact with blacks may be no 
better at identifying them than those who have not ... 
Finally, some jurors may deny the existence of the 
own-race effect in the misguided belief that it is merely 
a racist myth exemplified by the derogatory remark, 
"they all look alike to me," while others may believe in 
the reality of this effect but be reluctant to discuss it in 
deliberations for fear of being seen as bigots. /d. at 
368, 690 P.2d at 721, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 248. 
United States v. Downing 
The leading federal case recognizing the usefulness of 
expert testimony is United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 
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1224 (3d Cir. 1985). Agreeing with the state courts in 
Chapple and McDonald, the Third Circuit held that 
"under certain circumstances expert testimony on the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications can assist the jury 
in reaching a correct decision and therefore may meet 
the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702." /d. at 1231. 
See also United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984). 
The court, however, remanded the case to the district 
court to determine the issue. On remand, the trial court 
excluded the evidence. United States v. Downing, 609 F. 
Supp. 784 (E. D. Pa. 1985). 
United States v. Moore 
Following the trend of the recent cases, the Fifth Cir-
cuit also has altered its position on the admissibility of 
expert testimony concerning eyewitness identifications. 
In United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986), 
the court commented: 
Expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is not 
simply a recitation of facts available through common 
knowledge. Indeed, the conclusions of the psychologi-
cal studies are largely counter-intuitive ... For exam-
ple, it is commonly believed that the accuracy of a 
witness' recollection increases with the certainty of 
the witness. In fact, the data reveal no correlation 
between witness certainty and accuracy. 
Similarly, it is commonly believed that witnesses 
remember better when they are under stress. The data 
indicate that the opposite is true. The studies also 
show that a group consensus among witnesses as to 
an alleged criminal's identity is far more likely to be 
inaccurate than is an individual identification. This is 
because of the effect of the "feedback factor," which 
serves to reinforce mistaken identifications. We there-
fore recognize that the admission of this type of testi-
mony is proper, at least in some cases.ld. at 1312. 
Although the court went on to uphold the exclusion of 
expert testimony in the case under review, it again high-
lighted its change in attitude: "We emphasize that in a 
case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewitness 
identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of 
that identification is admissible and properly may be 
encouraged." /d. at 1313. 
State v. Buell 
In State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124,489 N.E.2d 795 
(1986), the Ohio Supreme Court also recognized the 
admissibility of expert testimony. Relying on Downing, 
Chapple, and McDonald, the court ruled that expert 
testimony concerning the factors that may impair the 
accuracy of a typical eyewitness identification is admissi-
ble under Ohio Evidence Rule 702. The court, neverthe-
less, limited its decision in one important respect. 
According to the court, expert testimony concerning the 
credibility of the identification testimony of a particular 
witness is inadmissible "absent a showing that the 
witness suffers from a mental or physical impairment 
which would affect the witness' ability to observe or recall 
events." /d. at 133, 489 N.E.2d at 804. 
For other state cases accepting such testimony, see 
People v. Brooks, 128 Misc. 2d 608, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692 
(Westchester Cty. Ct. 1985); State v. Moon, 40 Grim. L. 
Rptr. (BNA) 21-22 (Wash. Ct. App, Oct. 20, 1986); An not., 
46 A.L.R.4th 1047 (1986). 
Research 
Most of the researchers who have studied this issue 
believe that expert testimony would assist jurors in evalu-
ating eyewitness testimony. For example, one recent 
study concluded that "the present data refute the claim 
that expert psychological testimony on eyewitness iden-
tifications would not tell the jury members anything they 
do not already know. Not only do jury members overesti-
mate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications in target-
present lineups, they also appear unaware, to some 
extent, of the sources of error associated with this type of 
evidence." Brigham & Bothwell, supra at 29. This view, 
however, is not universally accepted. Two psychologists 
have written .that "the available evidence fails to demon-
strate that expert psychological testimony will routinely 
improve juror's ability to evaluate eyewitness testimony." 
McCloskey & Egeth, Eyewitness Identification: What Can 
a Psychologist Tell a Jury?, 38 Am. Psychologist 550, 558 
(1983). See also McCloskey & Egeth, A Time to Speak, or 
a Time to Keep Silence?, 38 Am. Psychologists 573 
(1983); Egeth & McCloskey, Expert Testimony About 
6 
E-yewitness Behavior: Is It Safe. and Effective?, in Eyewit-
ness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives 283 (G. 
Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1984). 
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